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Abstract 
 
The psychological flexibility model offers a lens through which to view the 
development and maintenance of PTSD symptoms. The model consists of six 
behavioral processes, including cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, and lack of 
contact with the present moment, which are said to interact with each other to either 
resolve or maintain symptoms of PTSD. The mediation models proposed within the 
psychological flexibility model have yet to be examined within any sample. This study 
examined the relationships between cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, lack of 
contact with the present moment, and PTSD intrusion symptoms within a sample of 
trauma-exposed adults experiencing symptoms of posttraumatic stress (N = 308). 
Results indicated that all three of the behavioral processes predicted PTSD intrusion 
symptoms, as hypothesized within the model. Also as hypothesized, cognitive fusion 
predicted both experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the present moment. 
Experiential avoidance mediated the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD 
intrusion symptoms, but lack of contact with the present moment did not. Contrary to 
expectations, experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the present moment did 
not both significantly and uniquely contribute to PTSD intrusion symptom severity. 
Experiential avoidance had a significant and unique impact in the model, but lack of 
contact with the present moment did not. These results provide support for many of the 
proposed relationships within the psychological flexibility model and also highlight 
the possibility that experiential avoidance may play a larger role in the development 
and maintenance of PTSD intrusion symptom severity than that of lack of contact with 
the present moment.  
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The Psychological Flexibility Model and PTSD Intrusion Symptoms 
 
The psychological flexibility model (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 
2006) rests on the assumption that, regardless of the form that human problems take 
across time and cultures, the human experience of pain is ubiquitous (Hayes, Strosahl, 
& Wilson, 1999, 2012). Pain is believed to be naturally occurring and transient. 
Although pain may feel uncomfortable, the philosophy underlying the model indicates 
that it is one component of a broad dimension: the human capacity to feel emotions 
(Linehan, 1993). Without pain there could not be joy; without anger there could not be 
compassion. The ability to feel pain intensely and to remain in contact with 
experiences of pain means that joy can be felt with equal intensity and awareness. 
Thus, the authors of the psychological flexibility model deem pain an important part of 
human experience (Hayes et al., 2012; Walser & Westrup, 2007).  
Alternatively to the natural existence of pain, the psychological flexibility 
model contains the proposition that humans create suffering when they attempt to 
negate or avoid their experiences of pain (Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; Follette, Palm, & 
Pearson, 2006). In modern Western cultures, it is common for people to feel pain and 
then turn on the television, go to sleep, or tell themselves that their pain is less than the 
pain of others, all in an attempt to escape from the experience of their uncomfortable 
emotions. Proverbs regarding the key to happiness abound. Pain, in its many forms, is 
unwanted, and happiness is prized. The theorists behind the psychological flexibility 
model warn that negating one’s pain comes at a cost: the implicit message that an 
aspect of one’s experience is “bad” or “wrong,” or even worse, that part of one’s self 
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is “wrong” (Hayes et al., 2012; Walser & Westrup, 2007). The model is based on the 
assumption that, unlike pain, suffering is avoidable (Follette et al., 2006).  
The psychological flexibility model stems from a contextual behavioral theory 
regarding the development and maintenance of psychological problems: relational 
frame theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). The model is based on 
the RFT premise that certain relationships with language lead to the creation of 
suffering, or to the creation of most psychological problems. Six behavioral processes 
constitute the model, and interact with each other, language, and behavioral context to 
produce psychological flexibility or inflexibility. Psychological flexibility is defined as 
“the ability to contact the present moment more fully as a conscious human being, and 
to change or persist in behavior when doing so serves valued ends” (Hayes et al., 
2006, p. 7). On the other hand, psychological inflexibility occurs when behavioral 
repertoires narrow, often as people avoid painful thoughts and feelings in an attempt to 
achieve a specific internal state or maintain a self-image (Hayes et al., 2006). For the 
purposes of this study, three of the six behavioral processes are examined: cognitive 
fusion, experiential avoidance, and lack of contact with the present moment.  
The psychological flexibility model is proposed to provide a theoretical 
foundation from which most types of psychological problems can be conceptualized 
and treated (Hayes et al., 2006). Although facets of the model have been examined in 
relation to depression (Bond & Bunce, 2000; Hayes et al., 2004; Plumb, Orsillo, & 
Luterek, 2004), generalized anxiety disorder (Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005) 
, trichotillomania (Begotka, Woods, & Wetterneck, 2004) , physical pain (McCracken 
& Gutiérrez-Martínez, 2011; McCracken, Williams, & Tang, 2011; Vowles, 
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McCracken, & O’Brien, 2011), and posttraumatic stress disorder (Batten, Follette, & 
Aban, 2002; Kumpula, Orcutt, Bardeen, & Varkovitzky, 2011; Maack, Tull, & Gratz, 
2011; Marx & Sloan, 2005; Merwin, Zachary Rosenthal, & Coffey, 2009; Tull, Gratz, 
Salters, & Roemer, 2004), much of this research has focused on the relationships 
between a single behavioral process, experiential avoidance, the diagnostic criteria of 
the disorders, and known correlates of the disorders. The claim that the 
interrelationships between the behavioral processes in the psychological flexibility 
model can account for the development and maintenance of most psychological 
disorders remains unexamined. 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an important psychological problem 
and is the most commonly diagnosed psychological disorder following the experience 
of a traumatic event (APA, 2013). Traumatic events include experiences such as 
sexual assault, physical abuse, exposure to war, exposure to natural disaster, criminal 
victimization, and combat exposure. PTSD impacts approximately 8% of the United 
States population (APA, 2000; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 
Christopher, 1995) and accrues great costs to society via lost work hours and increased 
utilization of the healthcare system (Greenberg et al., 1999; Koss, Koss, & Woodruff, 
1991).  
PTSD is conceptualized as having four distinct symptom clusters: intrusion, 
avoidance, negative alterations in cognitions and mood, and arousal (APA, 2013). The 
intrusion symptom cluster consists of recurrent and distressing memories of the 
traumatic event, flashbacks, or trauma-related dreams, as well as intense psychological 
distress and physiological reactions to reminders of the traumatic event. The avoidance 
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symptom cluster encompasses attempts to avoid internal thoughts and feelings related 
to the traumatic event, as well as external cues, such as people, places, or things that 
serve as trauma reminders. Negative alterations in cognitions and mood include: 
difficulty remembering an important part of the traumatic event; a loss of interest in 
activities that previously brought enjoyment; feelings of detachment from others; 
difficulty experiencing positive emotions; persistent negative states of emotion, such 
as fear, anger, or guilt; and persistent inaccurate trauma-related thoughts, either 
exaggerated negative beliefs or inaccurate thoughts about the cause of the event, that 
lead individuals to blame themselves or others. The arousal symptom cluster consists 
of difficulties with concentration and sleep, an exaggerated startle response, 
hypervigilance, irritable behavior, and self-destructive behavior.  
The current study focuses on PTSD intrusion symptoms for two reasons. First, 
the intrusion symptom cluster has remained the same through the recent transition 
from the DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5 (APA, 2000; APA, 2013). Second, PTSD 
intrusion symptoms may play an important role in the maintenance of PTSD. Trauma 
researchers have proposed that the presence of trauma-related intrusions leads some 
trauma-exposed individuals to engage in avoidance behaviors designed to mitigate any 
uncomfortable thoughts, emotions, or physiological sensations associated with the 
intrusions (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). These researchers state that avoidance behaviors 
serve to decrease functioning and increase the frequency and severity of trauma-
related intrusions (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Indeed, trauma-related intrusions predict 
subsequent symptoms of avoidance and general psychological functioning, such that, 
as endorsement of intrusive symptoms increases, avoidance also increases and general 
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psychological functioning decreases (Creamer, Burgess, & Pattison, 1992; McFarlane, 
1992).  The hypothesis that the intrusion symptom cluster may play an important role 
in the maintenance of PTSD is also supported by the finding that intrusions are a 
stronger predictor of PTSD symptom severity 6 months after the experience of a 
traumatic event than PTSD diagnostic status at baseline assessment (Michael, Ehlers, 
Halligan, & Clark, 2005). Thus, it is important to examine potential maintenance 
factors of the intrusion symptom cluster.    
Cognitive Fusion, Experiential Avoidance, and PTSD Intrusion Symptoms 
The psychological flexibility model contains the proposition that cognitive 
fusion and experiential avoidance, two behavioral processes, both contribute to the 
development of most symptoms of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2001; Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 2012). Cognitive fusion is defined as the act of placing 
importance on the content of thoughts, such that people assume that their thought 
content is congruent with an external “reality” (Strosahl, Hayes, Wilson, & Gifford, 
2004). Cognitive fusion is conceptualized as a metacognitive behavioral process 
regarding the function of thoughts, and, thus, is believed to be distinct from 
topographical properties of thoughts, such as their frequency or content (Blackledge, 
2007). Proponents of the psychological flexibility model believe that cognitive fusion 
is problematic because people are said to evidence rigid behavioral patterns when they 
treat their thoughts as literal (Blackledge & Drake, 2013; Eifert & Forsyth, 2005). In 
opposition to the process of cognitive fusion stands cognitive defusion, a behavioral 
process that requires individuals to adopt a detached stance from thought content, 
including the recognition that thinking is an event that produces products, or thoughts, 
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that are not necessarily representative of an underlying essence (Hayes et al., 2012; 
Luoma & Hayes, 2009).  
The proposal that cognitive fusion contributes to the maintenance of 
psychopathology can easily be applied to the maintenance of PTSD intrusion 
symptoms. It is possible that cognitive fusion influences individuals’ relationships to 
their trauma-related intrusions, such that the intrusions serve the function of indicating 
the presence of the traumatic event (Blackledge, 2004). That is, individuals 
experiencing PTSD intrusions may be so merged with or focused on the content of 
their intrusions that they behaviorally respond as if the intrusions represent literal 
truths (Blackledge & Drake, 2013; Dymond, Roche, & Bennett, 2013). For example, 
trauma-exposed individuals who are experiencing symptoms of posttraumatic stress 
may see images of their assailants in their minds and then respond to the images by 
engaging in safety behaviors designed to protect them from real and present threats to 
their safety, such as checking to make sure their doors are locked, arming themselves 
with pepper spray, or ducking behind a piece of furniture. These trauma-exposed 
individuals may also involuntarily respond to the images with increased heart rates, 
blood pressure, and electrical conductance of the skin, and will be less likely to focus 
on the contextual features of the images, which may include the rooms they are in 
while the images enter their minds, what they were doing immediately before the 
images arose, and the quality of their breath in response to the images. Although initial 
findings provide support for a positive relationship between cognitive fusion and 
general psychopathology, including symptoms of anxiety and depression (Gillanders 
et al., 2013), the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom 
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severity has yet to be examined. Empirical research is needed to examine the proposed 
theoretical link between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity.  
The second behavioral process presented in the psychological flexibility model 
is experiential avoidance. Experiential avoidance is an unwillingness to remain in 
contact with thoughts, emotions, and sensations, including attempts to alter their 
content, form, or frequency (Strosahl et al., 2004). Experientially avoidant behaviors 
are believed to engender suffering, or general psychopathology, for two main reasons: 
Experiential avoidance leads to: 1) an increase in the frequency and intensity of the 
avoided internal stimuli, and 2) a narrowing of behavior (Blackledge & Barnes-
Holmes, 2009; Hayes et al., 2006; Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006). The 
observed increase in the frequency and intensity of avoided internal stimuli can be 
explained by the fact that individuals who allocate mental resources to scanning their 
mind for signs of feared stimuli invariably contribute to the continued presence of the 
stimuli, for they must hold a representation of the stimuli in their mind with which to 
compare all other stimuli (Nixon, Cain, Nehmy, & Seymour, 2009; Wenzlaff, Wegner, 
& Klein, 1991; Wisco, Pineles, Shipherd, & Marx, 2013). Experiential avoidance leads 
to a narrowing of behavior because individuals become increasingly restricted in 
behavioral options as they survey potential behaviors and behavioral contexts (i.e., 
going to the movies, going grocery shopping, jogging in their neighborhood) in which 
the unwanted stimuli might appear, either as a physical representation in the external 
world or as a thought or image in their mind upon encountering a trauma trigger in 
their external environment. The counterpart to experiential avoidance, experiential 
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acceptance, is the process of nonjudgmentally and willingly contacting the present 
moment (Hayes et al., 1999).  
The proposed relationship between experiential avoidance and general 
psychopathology can also be applied to the maintenance of PTSD intrusion symptoms. 
In this case, experiential avoidance leads to the maintenance of intrusion symptoms by 
causing an increase in the frequency and intensity of the intrusions, the avoided 
internal stimuli (Blackledge & Barnes-Holmes, 2009; Hayes et al., 2006; Kashdan et 
al., 2006; Shipherd & Beck, 2000; Walser & Hayes, 2006; Walser & Westrup, 2007).  
It is somewhat counterintuitive that increased levels of experiential avoidance 
lead to an increase in intrusion symptom frequency and intensity, as these two 
constructs appear to be opposite in nature. However, the creators of RFT state that 
when people engage in experientially avoidant behaviors they strengthen the 
relationship between the behavior and the avoided stimuli by pairing them together: 
when encounter x, engage in y (Hayes et al., 2001; Levin & Hayes, 2009). 
Additionally, RFT contains the premise that relationships between stimuli are 
bidirectional, meaning that the presence of one stimulus would evoke the other, or at 
least the functions of the other (Hayes et al., 2001). Intrusion symptoms increase as 
more and more stimuli become paired with both the intrusive stimuli and the 
experientially avoidant behavior and subsequently evoke the intrusive stimuli (Hayes 
et al., 2001; Walser & Westrup, 2007). For example, the image of a perpetrator’s face 
in a trauma survivor’s mind initially becomes associated with an angry mood and 
behavior intended to suppress the image. Later, the trauma survivor is listening to the 
radio and experiences the intrusive image. The image is then paired with the song that 
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was playing on the radio, such that listening to the song may bring the intrusive image 
back to mind.  
A large body of research has focused on the impact of thought suppression, a 
form of experiential avoidance, on cognition. Indeed, evidence suggests that thought 
suppression leads to a “rebound effect,” or an increase in the self-report of avoided 
internal stimuli (Wegner & Gold, 1995; Wegner, 1994; Wegner, Schneider, Knutson, 
& McMahon, 1991; Wenzlaff et al., 1991). Some researchers have examined the 
phenomenon of thought suppression within individuals who meet criteria for PTSD. 
As hypothesized, suppressing trauma-related thoughts does result in a “rebound effect” 
for individuals who meet criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD (Amstadter & Vernon, 2006; 
J. Shipherd & Beck, 2000). One set of researchers found that intrusion symptoms 
increased in motor vehicle accident survivors as more and more stimuli became paired 
with the intrusive stimuli (Steil & Ehlers, 2000). Additionally, thought suppression has 
been shown to be correlated, moderately and positively, with PTSD symptom severity 
in numerous samples (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998) and has been found to predict 
PTSD intrusion symptom severity (Wisco et al., 2013). Empirical data regarding the 
significant and positive relationship between thought suppression and intrusive 
thoughts lends credibility to the proposition, within the psychological flexibility 
model, that avoidance or negation of internal experience relates to increased frequency 
of the avoided internal experience.  
As hypothesized by the authors of the model, there are findings demonstrating 
a moderate and positive relationship between experiential avoidance and PTSD 
intrusion symptom severity (Gold, Feinstein, Skidmore, & Marx, 2011; Kumpula et 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY AND PTSD                                                 12				 
al., 2011; Meyer & Morissette, 2013; Rosenthal, Rasmussen Hall, Palm, Batten, & 
Follette, 2008; Tull, Barrett, McMillan, & Roemer, 2007; Tull et al., 2004; Tull, 
Jakupcak, Paulson, & Gratz, 2007; Tull & Roemer, 2003). The moderate and positive 
relationship has been found to hold across type of traumatic event. For example, 
experiential avoidance significantly related to PTSD intrusion symptom severity in a 
sample of combat-exposed veterans (Meyer & Morissette, 2013), survivors of 
childhood sexual and physical assault (Gold et al., 2011; Rosenthal et al., 2008), adult 
females exposed to a campus shooting (Kumpula et al., 2011), Kosovo citizens 
exposed to war crimes (Kashdan, Morina, & Priebe, 2009), survivors of adult 
interpersonal violence (Tull, Jakupcak, et al., 2007; Tull & Roemer, 2003), and a 
sample of participants who experienced multiple traumatic experiences (Tull et al., 
2004). Additionally, the relationship between the two variables was replicated within a 
sample of trauma-exposed adolescents (Shenk, Putnam, & Noll, 2012).  
Experiential avoidance has also demonstrated unique predictive power of 
PTSD total symptom severity (Meyer et al., 2013; Orcutt, Pickett, & Pope, 2005; 
Plumb, Orsillo, & Luterek, 2004). Experiential avoidance has predicted PTSD 
symptom severity beyond that predicted by the experience of traumatic interpersonal 
events (Orcutt et al., 2005), trauma severity (Plumb et al., 2004), and a host of peri- 
and posttruama variables, including the presence of combat exposure, perceived threat 
during trauma, peritraumatic dissociation, social support, and recent life stress (Meyer 
& Morissette, 2013).  
Building upon the proposed relationships between cognitive fusion, 
experiential avoidance, and general psychopathology, the psychological flexibility 
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model contains the added hypothesis that experiential avoidance mediates the 
relationship between cognitive fusion and general psychopathology. Cognitive fusion 
is thought to lead to experiential avoidance because literal interpretations of language 
may ineffectively guide behavior (Hayes et al., 2012).  Language serves to alert 
individuals to stimuli in their environment. Yelling, “Watch out!” when someone is 
walking into oncoming traffic can help people to modify their behavior and keep 
themselves safe. In the above example, taking a literal interpretation of “Watch out,” 
that is, assuming that there was something to watch out for, may have proved helpful 
to the individual who heard the warning. However, there are instances of language that 
do not completely correlate to the external environment. For example, having a 
thought about an impending outcome does not mean that that outcome is going to 
happen. Labeling a stimulus as “good” or “bad” in your mind does not provide 
concrete information about the characteristics and context of the stimulus as they 
appear in the external environment. When words do not correspond to their referent 
and are taken as literal truth, then they may ineffectively influence behavior. That is 
because fusion with thought content often leads to inappropriate avoidance of stimuli 
that are not present in individuals’ external surroundings. For example, when 
individuals use evaluative language such as “bad” to label their experiences, such as 
experiencing an intrusive image related to their assailant while watching television, 
they thereby increase their desire to escape the experience, which often leads them to 
engage in behaviors of experiential avoidance (Hayes et al., 2006).  The relationships 
between cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, and general symptoms of 
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psychopathology are thought to account for the proposed significance of the 
relationship between cognitive fusion and general symptoms of psychopathology.  
Applying the proposed mediation model to PTSD intrusion symptoms, it is 
possible that experiential avoidance mediates the relationship between cognitive fusion 
and PTSD intrusion symptom severity. Initial data, collected within 4 samples – a 
sample of prison service officers, adults with multiple sclerosis, a sample of clients 
receiving mental health services, and employees participating in a stress-management 
workshop - suggests that cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance are strongly and 
positively correlated (Gillanders et al., 2013), but the relationship between the two 
constructs has not yet been examined within a sample of trauma-exposed individuals 
experiencing symptoms of posttraumatic stress. There are 4 questions that must be 
examined to test the proposed relationships between cognitive fusion, experiential 
avoidance, and PTSD intrusion symptom severity (see Figure 1): 1). Does cognitive 
fusion significantly relate to PTSD intrusion symptom severity? Although this 
relationship has been implied, it has yet to be empirically tested. 2). Does cognitive 
fusion significantly relate to experiential avoidance? Again, this proposed relationship 
has not been empirically examined. 3). Does experiential avoidance significantly relate 
to PTSD intrusion symptom severity? Experiential avoidance has most been 
demonstrably related to PTSD intrusion symptom severity, and these past findings 
would need to be confirmed within the present study. 4). Does experiential avoidance 
mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity?  
 






Figure 1.  Theoretical relationship between cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, and PTSD 
intrusion symptom severity.  
 
 
Cognitive Fusion, Lack of Contact with the Present Moment, and PTSD Intrusion 
Symptoms 
 The psychological flexibility model contains the proposition that a third 
behavioral process, lack of contact with the present moment, also contributes to the 
development of most symptoms of psychopathology (Walser & Hayes, 2006). Lack of 
contact with the present moment occurs when people spend time thinking about 
thoughts, feelings, and physical sensations experienced in the past, or imagining such 
experiences taking place in the future (Blackledge & Barnes-Holmes, 2009). The 
creators of the psychological flexibility model state that lack of contact with the 
present moment contributes to the development of symptoms of psychopathology 
because awareness of current experience is needed to engage in acceptance and non-
judgment of that experience (Hayes et al., 2012). These psychological theorists 
indicate that individuals whose attention is focused outside of the present moment are 
not able to consciously choose value-consistent behaviors and productively engage 
with their environment. Conversely, contact with the present moment occurs when 
people center their awareness in their current thoughts, feelings, and physical 
sensations.  
Cognitive fusion 	 PTSD intrusion symptom severity 
Experiential avoidance  
          (mediator) 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY AND PTSD                                                 16				 
Lack of contact with the present moment may lead to PTSD intrusion 
symptoms because individuals who direct their attention away from experiences 
occurring in the present moment, including thoughts, feelings, physiological 
sensations, and sensory perceptions, may have difficulty accepting their experiences 
and may engage in behaviors that could be classified as avoidance (Blackledge & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2009; Vujanovic, Niles, Pietrefesa, Schmertz, & Potter, 2013; Walser 
& Westrup, 2007). That is, “contact” refers to attention, and when attention is directed 
toward the present moment individuals may practice experiential acceptance of their 
present experiences (Follette, Palm, & Rasmussen Hall, 2004; Hayes et al., 2012). 
Initial data indicates that there may, indeed, be a significant and negative 
relationship between lack of contact with the present moment and PTSD total 
symptom severity (Bernstein, Tanay, & Vujanovic, 2011; Smith et al., 2011; 
Vujanovic et al., 2013).  Researchers examined a sample of 124 urban firefighters and 
a sample of 76 adults exposed to at least one traumatic event and found evidence of a 
moderate and positive significant relationship between lack of contact with the present 
moment and PTSD total symptom severity in both cases (Bernstein et al., 2011; Smith 
et al., 2011). Lack of contact with the present moment was also a unique contributor to 
PTSD symptom severity when examined alongside the number of traumatic events 
experienced by each participant (Bernstein et al., 2011) and in relation to demographic 
variables and quantitative descriptors of exposure to fires on the job (Smith et al., 
2011). Although one group of researchers found that lack of contact with the present 
moment was not correlated with any of the PTSD symptom clusters within a sample of 
veterans, these results are likely attributed to an underpowered, low sample size: 15 
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combat-exposed veterans with diagnoses of PTSD, 15 combat-exposed veterans 
without diagnoses of PTSD, and 15 non-combat veterans without diagnoses of PTSD 
(Wahbeh, Lu, & Oken, 2011). However, future studies are needed to examine the 
relationship between contact with the present moment and PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity in a trauma-exposed sample.  
The authors of the psychological flexibility model further posit that lack of 
contact with the present moment mediates the relationship between cognitive fusion 
and symptoms of general psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2012). These psychological 
researchers indicate that cognitive fusion leads to lack of contact with the present 
moment because of over-identification with thought content that is past- or future-
focused (Walser & Westrup, 2007). When individuals take their thoughts literally, 
they focus on the content of the thought as a manifestation of reality, rather than 
directing their attention toward their immediate process of thinking. Because these 
individuals are, then, fused with the content of their thoughts, their attention is drawn 
away from the present moment and they demonstrate lack of contact with the present 
moment (Blackledge & Drake, 2013). Lack of contact with the present moment and 
cognitive fusion are both hypothesized to relate to general symptoms of 
psychopathology, and the psychological flexibility model contains the added 
hypothesis that lack of contact with the present moment mediates the relationship 
between cognitive fusion and symptoms of psychopathology, placing emphasis on the 
role of attention in the development of psychopathology.  
The proposed mediation model can also be applied to PTSD intrusion 
symptoms. It is possible that lack of contact with the present moment mediates the 
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relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity. 
Although psychological researchers have begun to examine the relationships between 
cognitive fusion and known correlates of lack of contact with the present moment, no 
studies were found, within any sample, that have focused directly on cognitive fusion 
as it relates to lack of contact with the present moment. There are four questions that 
must be asked to test the proposed relationships between cognitive fusion, lack of 
contact with the present moment, and PTSD intrusion symptom severity (see Figure 
2): 1). Does cognitive fusion significantly relate to PTSD intrusion symptom severity? 
An empirical examination of this question would be conducted within an analysis of 
the first mediation model proposed within this study. 2). Does cognitive fusion 
significantly relate to lack of contact with the present moment? Empirical data is 
needed to examine this theoretical relationship. 3). Does lack of contact with the 
present moment significantly relate to PTSD intrusion symptom severity? There is 
initial data to suggest that lack of contact with the present moment significantly relates 
to PTSD total symptom severity. For the proposed mediation model to hold, results 
within the current study would need to confirm the hypothesis that lack of contact with 
the present moment does relate to PTSD intrusion symptom severity. 4). Does lack of 
contact with the present moment mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion 
















Figure 2.  Theoretical relationship between cognitive fusion, lack of contact with the present 
moment, and PTSD intrusion symptom severity.  
 
Experiential Avoidance, Lack of Contact with the Present Moment, and PTSD 
Intrusion Symptoms 
The authors of the psychological flexibility model indicate that experiential 
avoidance and lack of contact with the present moment are unique, but related, 
behavioral processes. Indeed, there is indication that the behavioral processes are 
correlated at a moderate level within populations experiencing chronic pain (Herzberg 
et al., 2012; Latzman & Masuda, 2013; McCracken & Gutiérrez-Martínez, 2011; 
McCracken et al., 2011), within a sample of adult outpatients presenting for cognitive-
behavioral therapy (Silberstein, Tirch, Leahy, & McGinn, 2012), and within 
nonclinical college populations (R. A. Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 
2006; Masuda & Tully, 2012). These recent results provide preliminary support for the 
conceptualization of experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the present 
moment as separate, but related, constructs.  
The psychological flexibility model also encompasses the assumption that both 
experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the present moment are unique 
contributors to psychological distress, including PTSD intrusion symptom severity 
(Hayes et al., 2006). Although research examining experiential avoidance and lack of 
Lack of contact with the 
present moment 
          (mediator) 
Cognitive fusion PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity 
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contact with the present moment, as they both relate to PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity, has yet to be conducted, findings within chronic pain samples have 
demonstrated that only experiential avoidance, and not lack of contact with the present 
moment, uniquely contributed to insomnia severity (McCracken & Gutiérrez-
Martínez, 2011; McCracken et al., 2011). It is important to assess whether or not both 
behavioral processes, experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the present 
moment, uniquely contribute to PTSD intrusion symptom severity, to test the 
relationships proposed within the model.   
It has been proposed that both experiential avoidance and lack of contact with 
the present moment are equally powerful mediators of the relationship between 
cognitive fusion and symptoms of general psychopathology (see Figure 3; Dymond et 
al., 2013; Hayes et al., 2006). However, this hypothesis has not yet been empirically 
examined. Further research is needed to assess whether or not one of the behavioral 
processes is a more powerful mediator of the relationship between cognitive fusion 








Figure 3.  Theoretical relationship between cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, lack of 
contact with the present moment, and PTSD intrusion symptom severity.  
 
The Present Study  
Mediators (experiential 
avoidance and lack of 
contact with the present 
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The current study seeks to examine the hypotheses that three behavioral 
processes - cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, and lack of contact with the 
present moment - are partially responsible for the development of most symptoms of 
psychopathology, by investigating the hypotheses within a sample of trauma-exposed 
adults experiencing symptoms of posttraumatic stress. Although prior research 
indicates that experiential avoidance is related to symptoms of posttraumatic stress, 
further research is needed to examine the relationship between cognitive fusion and 
symptoms of posttraumatic stress, as well as the relationship between lack of contact 
with the present moment and symptoms of posttraumatic stress. Additionally, the 
mediation models proposed within the psychological flexibility model, whereby both 
experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the present moment significantly and 
uniquely mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and general symptoms of 
psychopathology, have yet to be examined within any sample, nevertheless a trauma-
exposed sample. It is important to empirically examine the relationships between these 
three behavioral processes and PTSD intrusion symptom severity, as the psychological 
flexibility model provides a theoretical basis on which to build treatments for PTSD. 
The present study will examine the relationships between cognitive fusion, 
experiential avoidance, lack of contact with the present moment, and PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity, and will test the mediation models proposed within the 
psychological flexibility model.  
1. Cognitive Fusion, Experiential Avoidance, and PTSD Intrusion Symptom 
Severity 
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a. It is hypothesized that cognitive fusion will predict PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity. 
b. It is hypothesized that cognitive fusion will predict experiential 
avoidance. 
c. It is hypothesized that experiential avoidance will predict PTSD 
intrusion symptom severity.  
d. It is hypothesized that experiential avoidance will mediate the 
relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity.  
2. Cognitive Fusion, Lack of Contact with the Present Moment, and PTSD 
Intrusion Symptom Severity 
a. It is hypothesized that cognitive fusion will predict PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity.  
b. It is hypothesized that cognitive fusion will predict lack of contact 
with the present moment.  
c. It is hypothesized that lack of contact with the present moment will 
predict PTSD intrusion symptom severity.  
d. It is hypothesized that lack of contact with the present moment will 
mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD 
intrusion symptom severity.  
3. Experiential Avoidance and Lack of Contact with the Present Moment 
a. It is hypothesized that experiential avoidance and lack of contact 
with the present moment will be moderately related.  
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b. It is hypothesized that experiential avoidance and lack of contact 
with the present moment will both significantly and uniquely 
contribute to PTSD intrusion symptom severity. 
c. It is hypothesized that experiential avoidance will uniquely mediate 
the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity when lack of contact with the present moment is 
accounted for. 
d. It is hypothesized that lack of contact with the present moment will 
uniquely mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and 




The final sample consisted of 308 participants, 220 from the online community 
and 88 from the undergraduate research subject pool at UMSL. Age of participants 
ranged from 18- to 70-years-old, with a mean age of 32-years-old. Two hundred and 
thirty-seven participants (77%) identified as female, 58 (19%) identified as male, and 
13 (4%) identified as transgender or genderqueer. Participants largely identified as 
heterosexual (N = 224; 73%) and Caucasian (N = 237; 77%), with 83 participants 
(27%) identifying as belonging to a sexual minority and 64 participants (21%) 
identifying as belonging to a racial minority.  
One hundred and forty-seven participants (48%) identified as single, 84 (27%) 
identified as married or in a domestic partnership, 30 (10%) identified as divorced, 19 
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(6%) identified as separated or widowed, and 28 (10%) identified as living with 
someone. The majority of participants endorsed earning over $50,000 per year (N = 
93; 30%). Fifty-seven participants (19%) endorsed earning between $30,001 and 
$50,000 per year, 35 (11%) endorsed earning between $20,001 and $30,000 per year, 
44 (14%) endorsed earning between $10,001 and $20,000 per year, 35 (11%) reported 
earning between $5,001 and $10,000 per year, and 44 (14%) reported earning less than 
$5,000 per year.  
The sample was primarily composed of participants reporting about trauma 
symptoms in relation to a rape or sexual assault (N = 162; 53%). Additional endorsed 
trauma types include a sudden or violent unexpected death, domestic violence, 
physical abuse or assault, torture, witnessing of violent death, witnessing of robbery, 
animal attack, life threatening injury, and exposure to trauma during work as a 
firefighter or within law enforcement. Please see Table 1 for more information about 




Specified Trauma Type on PCL-S 
 
 	Trauma	Type	 	N	 	%		Sexual	abuse	 	162	 	52.6		Unexpected	Death	–		Sudden	or	Violent	 	40	 	13.0		Death	of	Other	–	No	Further	Details	(but	endorsed	experiencing	or	witnessing	a	sudden	
	26	 	8.4	
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violent	death	on	the	LEC)		Abuse	–	Unspecified	(but	endorsed	experiencing	physical	and/or	sexual	abuse	on	the	LEC)	
	25	 	8.1	
	Domestic	Violence	 	20	 	6.5		Physical	Abuse/Assault	 	20	 	6.5		Torture	 	2	 	0.6		Witnessed	Violent	Death	 	3	 	1.0		Witnessed	Robbery	 	1	 	0.3		Firefighter/Law	Enforcement	 	1	 	0.3		Animal	attack	 	1	 	0.3		Life	Threatening	Injury	 	1	 	0.3	
 
Average PCL-S total scores were calculated to determine the average PTSD 
total symptom severity of the sample. PCL-S total scores ranged from 20 to 85, M = 
56.79, SD = 16.01. The average PCL-S score in this sample was above the clinical cut-
off score of 50 (Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996), indicating 
that participants, in general, were experiencing clinically significant symptoms of 
posttraumatic stress. On the other hand, 108 of the 308 participants had PCL-S total 
scores under 50.  
Many participants endorsed experiencing multiple trauma types on the Life 
Events Checklist (LEC). Two hundred and thirty-nine participants endorsed either 
experiencing or witnessing physical assault, 121 endorsed experiencing or witnessing 
assault with a weapon, 220 endorsed experiencing or witnessing sexual assault, 198 
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endorsed experiencing, witnessing, or hearing about a sudden violent death, and 13 
endorsed experiencing combat. Of the above five trauma types, 5 participants endorsed 
all 5 types, 68 participants endorsed 4 types, 90 participants endorsed 3 types, 87 
participants endorsed 2 types, and 49 participants endorsed 1 type. On average, 
participants endorsed 2.60 of the above 5 trauma categories from the LEC.  
Participants from the two recruitment sources were combined in the final 
sample because the samples complement each other in terms of demographic 
variables, such as age, racial identity, and income level, as well as range of symptom 
severity, offering a greater variance than either recruitment source sample alone. 
Measures 
Demographics. Each participant completed a brief demographic questionnaire 
including information concerning age, gender, marital status, and income level. All 
questionnaire items are listed in Appendix A.  
The Life Events Checklist (LEC; Blake et al., 1995). The LEC lists many 
types of potentially traumatic experiences (e.g., natural disaster, physical assault) and 
asks participants to indicate whether or not they have experienced, witnessed, or 
learned about each type of experience at any point during their lifetime.  
The PTSD Checklist–Specific Version (PCL-S; Weathers, Huska, & Keane, 
1991). This 17-item self-report measure assesses DSM-IV-TR symptoms of 
posttraumatic stress disorder in response to an identified “stressful life experience.” 
Participants are requested to indicate “how much” they have been bothered by the 
symptoms in the past month by selecting a response on a scale that ranges from 1 (not 
at all) to 5 (extremely). Sample items are “Feeling jumpy or easily startled?” and 
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“Avoiding thinking about or talking about the stressful experience or avoiding having 
feelings related to it?” Total scores range from 17 to 85, with higher scores 
representing greater severity of symptoms. The PCL-S has demonstrated good internal 
consistency (α = .94), and total scores highly correlate (r = .93) with a clinician-
administered assessment of PTSD symptom severity within a sample of adult 
survivors of motor vehicle accidents and sexual assaults (Blanchard et al., 1996). The 
PCL-S has also demonstrated test-retest reliability (r = .96) over a 3-day period in a 
sample of Vietnam veterans (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993).  
The Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ; Gillanders et al., 2013). The 7 
items of the CFQ assess self-reported cognitive fusion. Cognitive fusion is 
conceptualized as a one-dimensional construct and participants’ scores fall on a 
continuum that ranges from cognitive fusion to cognitive defusion. Items are 
responded to on a scale ranging from 1 (never true) to 7 (always true). A total score 
ranges from 0 to 49, with higher numbers representing greater levels of cognitive 
fusion. Sample questions include “I find it easy to view my thoughts from a different 
perspective” and “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I am unable to do the things 
that I most want to do.” The CFQ has demonstrated good test-retest reliability (r = .80, 
p < .001) in convenience samples of young adults and healthy adults in the community 
(Gillanders, et al., 2013). Good internal consistency (α = .88 - .93) has also been found 
in samples of caregivers of people with dementia, adults with multiple sclerosis, 
clients participating in mental health services in the United Kingdom, and employees 
of the public sector in the United Kingdom (Gillanders et al., 2013).  As predicted, the 
CFQ is highly correlated with measures of burnout, automatic thoughts, and 
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rumination in prison service officers, mental health services clients in the United 
Kingdom, adults with and without histories of depression (Gillanders et al., 2013). 
Responses from populations of adults with multiple sclerosis, young adults, and health 
adults in the community show moderate correlations with quality of life and life 
satisfaction (Gillanders et al., 2013). Lastly, responses on the CFQ did not significant 
relate to socially desirable responses for a sample of community-living healthy adults 
(Gillanders et al., 2013).  
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011). 
The AAQ-II is a 7-item self-report scale that measures levels of experiential 
avoidance. Experiential avoidance is a continuous one-dimensional construct and 
participants’ scores fall within a continuum that ranges from experiential acceptance to 
experiential avoidance. Participants respond to items on a 1 (never true) to 7 (always 
true) scale. Sample questions include “I’m afraid of my feelings,” “My painful 
experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I would value,” 
and “I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings.” Total scores 
range from 0 to 49, with higher numbers representing greater amounts of experiential 
avoidance. The AAQ-II has demonstrated good internal consistency (α = .78 - .88) and 
test-retest reliability (r = .81 at 3-months and r = .79 at 12-months in samples of 
United States undergraduate students and employees of a retail bank and financial 
services organization in the United Kingdom (Bond et al., 2011). Concurrent validity 
has been established through positive correlations with depressive symptoms, 
symptoms of anxiety, and general symptoms of psychopathology in undergraduate 
students in the United States, adults seeking outpatient mental health treatment at an 
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urban hospital for substance misuse, United Kingdom employees of a retail bank and 
financial services organization, and Dutch adults with mild to moderate symptoms of 
anxiety and depression (Bond et al., 2011; Fledderus, Oude Voshaar, Ten Klooster, & 
Bohlmeijer, 2012). As theorized, United States undergraduate students responses on 
the AAQ-II, along with the responses of adult employees in the United Kingdom, 
significantly correlate with a measure of thought suppression, a specific form of 
experiential avoidance (Bond et al., 2011). And lastly, responses on the AAQ-II were 
not related to socially desirable responses in the sample of United Kingdom financial 
services employees (Bond et al., 2011).  
The Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 
2003).  The MAAS is a 15-item self-report measure of the frequency of attention and 
awareness to and of present-moment experiences, or lack of contact with the present 
moment. Items have a response scale that ranges from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost 
never). Total scores of the one-dimensional construct are obtained by computing the 
mean of the responses and range from 1 to 6, with higher scores representing less lack 
of contact with the present moment and more contact with the present moment. 
Sample items include “I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the 
present” and “I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they 
really grab my attention.” The MAAS has demonstrated good internal consistency 
within samples of college students, adult cancer patients, and adults from 48 states in 
the U.S. (α = .82 and α = .87). Four-week test-retest reliability was also good (r = .81, 
p < .0001) and the MAAS has demonstrated convergent validity through its positive 
associations with mindfulness toward behavior, awareness of inner experiences, and 
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positive affect, as well its negative associations with rumination, social anxiety, 
symptoms of depression, symptoms of general anxiety, anger, and negative affect in 
samples of undergraduate students and adults in the northeastern United States (Brown 
& Ryan, 2003).  
Procedure 
Participants were recruited from two sources: the undergraduate research 
participant pool at the University of Missouri-St. Louis and advertisements posted to 
internet sites, such as Craigslist and community support websites for individuals 
exposed to trauma. Community support websites included www.havoca.org, 
www.pandys.org, www.malesurvivor.org, www.myptsd.com, and 
www.psychforums.com. The recruitment ad was titled, “Online study seeking people 
who have experienced stressful life event” and indicated that participants would 
“complete a brief series of questionnaires online,” after which they could opt to enter 
into a drawing for a $25 Amazon gift card. The ad indicated that a participant would 
be eligible for the study if they were 18 years of age or older and had experienced a 
stressful life event.  
Participants were eligible for the study if they were 18 years of age or older, 
had experienced at least one Criterion A traumatic event (per the DSM-5) occurring 
prior to the one month period before their participation in this study, indicated that 
they were completing the PCL-S in reference to a criterion A event, and completed 
each of the measures in the survey.  
Eligible participants were asked to read an informed consent statement and 
indicate whether they agreed to participate before completing study measures. 
Following the informed consent, all participants completed a series of demographics 
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questions (Appendix A), the Life Events Checklist (Appendix B), the PTSD Checklist-
Specific Version (Appendix C), the Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (Appendix D), the 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (Appendix E), and the Mindful Attention and 
Awareness Scale (Appendix F). After all measures were completed, internet-recruited 
participants were directed to a separate web page and offered the opportunity to submit 
an e-mail address for entry into a raffle to win one of four $25 gift certificates to 
Amazon. Participants’ email addresses were collected separately from their survey 
responses so as to maintain participant confidentiality. All participants from the 
undergraduate research participant pool at the University of Missouri – St. Louis were 
offered 0.5 course credits for completing the survey.  
Participants were determined to have experienced a Criterion A traumatic 
event if they indicated that they were completing the PCL-S in reference to a Criterion 
A event, such as “rape,” “domestic violence,” or “witnessed a murder,” and had 
endorsed experiencing the corresponding trauma type on the LEC. Some participants 
who completed the survey were excluded from eligibility in the study because they did 
not complete the question on the PCL about their reference trauma, they indicated that 
they have not experienced trauma, their reference trauma was not Criterion A (i.e., 
“heart attack of husband”), their response was not interpretable (i.e., “homell”), or they 
did not provide enough detail to determine whether or not the event was Criterion A 
(i.e., “accident” rather than “life-threatening car accident”).  
Results 
Quantitative analyses were conducted using the Statistical Packages for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS).  A priori power analyses for the proposed analyses (medium 
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effect size, power = .80, alpha = .05) indicated a sample size of 85 (Cohen, 1992; Fritz 
& MacKinnon, 2007). 
Missing Data Strategy. A total of 1,073 participants (673 from the online community 
and 400 from the UMSL subject pool) began the survey, but many dropped out before 
completing the trauma symptom measure, the PCL-S. As participants’ eligibility for 
the study was determined, in part, by the trauma that they referenced at the beginning 
of the PCL-S, and the intrusion symptom items from the PCL-S make up the outcome 
variable for the study, all participants who did not complete the PCL-S were 
eliminated (N = 188). Additionally, participants who did not at least begin each 
questionnaire were eliminated. Sixteen participants were removed because they exited 
the survey prior to beginning the CFQ and 32 participants were removed because they 
exited prior to beginning the MAAS, the last questionnaire. At this point, the sample 
consisted of 837 participants, 453 from the online community and 384 from the 
subject pool at UMSL.  
Eligibility for Study.  Some participants who completed the survey were excluded 
from eligibility in the study because they indicated that they have not experienced 
trauma or their response was not interpretable. Additional participants were excluded 
because their reference trauma was not Criterion A or because they did not provide 
enough detail to determine whether or not the event was Criterion A. Next, 
participants whose identified trauma did not occur more than 30 days prior to their 
participation in the study, who were not 18 years of age or older, and who did not 
endorse the trauma on the Life Events Checklist corresponding to their reference 
trauma on the PCL-S were excluded. At this point, the eligible sample consisted of 
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315 participants, 224 from the online community and 91 from the undergraduate 
research subject pool at UMSL.  
 Due to the online data collection method there was a greater likelihood that 
participants may take the study multiple times or may select response options without 
reading or considering the corresponding item text. Thus, the dataset was scanned for 
repeated IP addresses. Five IP addresses were each found to be repeated once and 
random number generators were used to determine which five of the ten paired 
responses would be deleted. The dataset was also visually screened for participants 
who answered using all high or low responses to survey questions. No such response 
sets were found.  
Preliminary Analyses. Z-scores were generated for each measure total score to assist 
in the detection of univariate outliers and no outliers were detected; all z-scores were 
between -3.0 and 3.0. Mahalanobis distances were generated to detect multivariate 
outliers. Two participants violated the criterion Mahalanobis distances and were 
deleted, one for the combination of the CFQ and AAQ-2 total scores and one for the 
combination of the CFQ and MAAS total scores.  
Univariate normality was examined through inspection of skewness and 
kurtosis statistics, Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics with Lilliefors significance 
corrections, and visual inspection of histograms. Total scores on the CFQ and AAQ-2 
were moderately negatively skewed, PTSD intrusion symptom severity scores from 
the PCL-S were slightly negatively skewed, and MAAS total scores were 
approximately symmetrical. The total scores for all dependent variables except for the 
CFQ were platykurtic; total scores on the CFQ were mesokurtic.  
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Bivariate scatterplots indicated that most measure pairs demonstrated linear 
relationships. It is possible that linear analyses slightly underestimated the strength of 
the relationships between the AAQ-2 total score and the PCL-S intrusion symptom 
severity score and the MAAS total score and the PCL-S intrusion symptom severity 
score. Lastly, plots of the standardized residuals by the standardized predicted values 
were examined for homoscedasticity. A plot for the CFQ and MAAS total scores 
demonstrated slight heteroscedasticity, although all other plots demonstrated 
homoscedasticity.  
Covariates. Age, gender identity, sexual identity, race, marital status, income level, 
and recruitment source were all examined for their impact on the three dependent 
variables (experiential avoidance, lack of contact with the present moment, and PTSD 
intrusion symptoms), to determine whether or not they would be used as covariates 
within the primary analyses. A Pearson correlation was used to examine the 
relationship between age and each of the dependent variables. One-way between-
subjects MANOVA’s were used to examine the relationship between each of the 
additional potential covariates and the dependent variables.  
Age and sexual identity both impacted PTSD intrusion symptom severity [r = 
.15, p = .009 and F (1,305) = 9.07, p = .003, respectively], with older participants 
reporting more severe intrusion symptoms and participants identifying as sexual 
minorities endorsing greater intrusion symptom severity than participants identifying 
as heterosexual. Sexual identity also impacted experiential avoidance [F (1,305) = 
11.32, p = .001], with participants identifying as sexual minorities endorsing greater 
experiential avoidance than participants identifying as heterosexual.  
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Hypothesis 1a: Cognitive Fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity. It was 
expected that cognitive fusion would predict PTSD intrusion symptom severity. A 
simple linear regression was conducted and cognitive fusion was found to predict 
PTSD intrusion symptom severity when accounting for age and sexual identity, F 
(1,303) = 109.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. Cognitive fusion, age, and sexual identity 
predicted approximately 31% of the variance in PTSD intrusion symptom severity, 
while cognitive fusion alone predicted approximately 27% of the variance.  
Hypothesis 1b: Cognitive Fusion and Experiential Avoidance. It was expected that 
cognitive fusion would predict experiential avoidance. A simple linear regression was 
conducted and cognitive fusion predicted experiential avoidance when accounting for 
sexual identity, F (1,304) = 509.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .64. Cognitive fusion and sexual 
identity predicted approximately 64% of the variance in experiential avoidance; 
cognitive fusion alone also predicted 64% of the variance in experiential avoidance.  
Hypothesis 1c: Experiential Avoidance and PTSD Intrusion Symptom Severity. It 
was expected that experiential avoidance would predict PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity. A simple linear regression was conducted and experiential avoidance did 
predict PTSD intrusion symptom severity when accounting for age and sexual identity, 
F (1,303) = 83.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. Experiential avoidance, age, and sexual identity 
predicted approximately 26% of the variance in PTSD intrusion symptom severity, 
while experiential avoidance alone predicted approximately 24% of the variance.  
Hypothesis 1d: Mediation of Cognitive Fusion and PTSD Intrusion Symptom 
Severity by Experiential Avoidance. It was expected that experiential avoidance 
would mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom 
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severity. This hypothesis was tested by a bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Cognitive fusion did indirectly influence PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity through experiential avoidance, after controlling for the impact of 
sexual identity on both experiential avoidance and PTSD intrusion symptom severity. 
A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = .09), based 
on 1,000 bootstrap samples was between 0.15 and 0.28. Age was not used as a 
covariate for intrusion symptom severity due to limitations within the PROCESS 
macro.  
Hypothesis 2a: Cognitive Fusion and PTSD Intrusion Symptom Severity.  Please 
see Hypothesis 1a.  
Hypothesis 2b: Cognitive Fusion and Lack of Contact with the Present Moment. 
It was expected that cognitive fusion would predict lack of contact with the present 
moment. A simple linear regression was conducted and cognitive fusion predicted lack 
of contact with the present moment, F (1, 306) = 44.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Cognitive 
fusion predicted 13% of the total variance in lack of contact with the present moment.  
Hypothesis 2c: Lack of Contact with the Present Moment and PTSD Intrusion 
Symptom Severity. It was expected that lack of contact with the present moment 
would predict PTSD intrusion symptom severity. A simple linear regression was 
conducted and lack of contact with the present moment predicted PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity, F (1,303) = 13.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. Lack of contact with the 
present moment, age, and sexual identity predicted approximately 10% of the variance 
in intrusion symptom severity, while lack of contact with the present moment alone 
predicted approximately 5% of the variance.  
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Hypothesis 2d: Mediation of Cognitive Fusion and PTSD Intrusion Symptom 
Severity by Lack of Contact with the Present Moment.  It was expected that lack of 
contact with the present moment would mediate the relationship between cognitive 
fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity. This hypothesis was tested by a bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Lack of contact 
with the present moment did not mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and 
PTSD intrusion symptom severity, after controlling for the impact of sexual identity 
on PTSD intrusion symptom severity. A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence 
interval for the indirect effect (ab = .01), based on 1,000 bootstrap samples was 
between -0.01 and 0.03.  
Hypothesis 3a: Experiential Avoidance and Lack of Contact with the Present 
Moment. It was expected that experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the 
present moment would be moderately related. This hypothesis was tested using 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The AAQ and MAAS were significantly correlated 
(r = -.37, p < .001, ρ = 0.37).  
Hypothesis 3b: Experiential Avoidance, Lack of Contact with the Present 
Moment, and PTSD Intrusion Symptom Severity. It was expected that experiential 
avoidance and lack of contact with the present moment would both significantly and 
uniquely contribute to PTSD intrusion symptom severity. The results of a multiple 
regression, with age and sexual identity as covariates, indicated that experiential 
avoidance had a significant and unique impact in the model, F (1,302) = 67.22, p < 
.001, but lack of contact with the present moment did not, F (1,302) = 0.71, p = 0.40. 
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The four-predictor model was able to account for approximately 26% of the total 
variance of PTSD intrusion symptom severity.  
Hypothesis 3c: Mediation of Cognitive Fusion and PTSD Intrusion Symptom 
Severity by Experiential Avoidance, when Lack of Contact with the Present 
Moment is Accounted for.  It was expected that experiential avoidance would 
mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity when lack of contact with the present moment was accounted for. This 
hypothesis was tested using bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals with the 
alternate potential mediator entered as a covariate (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Experiential avoidance did not mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and 
PTSD intrusion symptom severity, after controlling for age, sexual identity, and lack 
of contact with the present moment on PTSD intrusion symptom severity. A bias-
corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect (ab = .06) based on 
1,000 bootstrap samples was between -0.005 and 0.14. The impact of sexual identity 
on experiential avoidance was not controlled for due to limitations within the 
PROCESS macro.  
Hypothesis 3d: Mediation of Cognitive Fusion and PTSD Intrusion Symptom 
Severity by Lack of Contact with the Present Moment, when Experiential 
Avoidance is Accounted for. It was expected that lack of contact with the present 
moment would mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity when experiential avoidance was accounted for. This hypothesis 
was tested using bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals with the alternate 
potential mediator entered as a covariate (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Lack of contact 
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with the present moment did not mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and 
PTSD intrusion symptom severity, after controlling for age, sexual identity, and 
experiential avoidance. A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval for the 
indirect effect (ab = .003) based on 1,000 bootstrap samples was between -0.02 and 
0.03. The impact of sexual identity on experiential avoidance was not controlled for 
due to limitations within the PROCESS macro.  
Discussion 
This study examined the relationships between three of the behavioral 
processes within the psychological flexibility model (cognitive fusion, experiential 
avoidance, and lack of contact with the present moment) and PTSD intrusion 
symptoms. This study offers important contributions to the literature, as it is the first 
study, known to this author, to examine the relationship between cognitive fusion and 
symptoms of posttraumatic stress, as well as the relationship between lack of contact 
with the present moment and symptoms of posttraumatic stress. Additionally, this 
study examined two proposed mediation models, which have not been previously 
examined, including the relative strength of the proposed mediators, and did so within 
a sample of participants experiencing symptoms of posttraumatic stress.  
Cognitive Fusion, Experiential Avoidance, and PTSD Intrusion Symptoms 
Cognitive fusion was found to predict PTSD intrusion symptom severity within 
this sample. Although cognitive fusion has previously been found to positively relate 
to symptoms of anxiety and depression (Gillanders et al., 2013), this is the first study, 
known by this author, to test the proposed relationship between cognitive fusion and 
PTSD intrusion symptom severity since the publication of the Cognitive Fusion 
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Questionnaire (CFQ) in 2013. The results of this study are consistent with recently 
published data demonstrating a positive significant relationship between cognitive 
fusion and PTSD total symptom severity (Nitzan-Assayag, Aderka, & Bernstein, 
2015). This finding implies that, when trauma-exposed individuals tend to take their 
thoughts as literal truths, they have more intense and more frequent PTSD intrusion 
symptoms.  
Cognitive fusion may be associated with PTSD intrusion symptom severity 
because taking thought content literally also likely means that trauma-related thought 
content will be taken at face value. That is, rather than acknowledging that their minds 
are producing trauma-related thoughts, individuals who are cognitively fused may 
behave as if their trauma-related thought content is “true” or “real.” The thought “I am 
not safe” comes to serve the function of alerting the thinking individual that they are 
literally unsafe, leading to further hypervigilant behaviors intended to secure safety. 
Cognitively fused individuals may then engage in avoidance behaviors designed to get 
away from their uncomfortable trauma-related thoughts and feelings, which would 
increase the frequency and intensity of PTSD intrusion symptoms.  
Cognitive defusion techniques may be helpful in reducing PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity. Such techniques are designed to assist individuals in temporarily 
weakening the meaning that words hold for them, and, potentially, weakening the 
relationship between their thoughts and behavior (Blackledge, 2015). One group of 
cognitive defusion techniques operates by violating social norms of speech. For 
example, it is expected that thoughts will be delivered in a manner that is congruent 
with their thought content. Angry thoughts are typically delivered with rapid and loud 
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speech, while sad thoughts are often spoken in a low volume at a slow rate. Thus, 
clients can be asked to speak their thoughts while imitating the voice of a cartoon 
character or to sing a troubling thought to a jovial tune (Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting, 
Twohig, & Wilson, 2004; Hayes et al., 1999), both of which violate social conventions 
regarding speech.  
Cognitive fusion also predicted experiential avoidance. This finding is consistent 
with initial data suggesting that cognitive fusion and experiential avoidance are 
strongly and positively correlated (Gillanders et al., 2013); however, this is the first 
known study to examine the hypothesis within a sample of trauma-exposed individuals 
experiencing symptoms of posttraumatic stress. It appears that relating to one’s 
thoughts at face value, as though the thoughts are literal truths, leads to avoidance of 
uncomfortable thoughts, feelings, and sensations. The process of thinking allows 
humans to generalize fear experienced during a traumatic experience to other potential 
experiences or stimuli that are perceived as similar to those present during their 
trauma. If trauma-related thoughts such as “I can’t trust anyone” or “I am not safe 
anywhere” are taken as literal truths then individuals’ behaviors will likely align with 
their thoughts. These individuals will refrain from forming close relationships and will 
isolate or engage in hypervigilant behaviors. When they continue to experience 
distressing thoughts and emotions while isolating and attempting to protect 
themselves, then they will likely attempt to escape their own internal experiences. 
Cognitive defusion techniques may be useful for these individuals, as cognitive 
defusion will assist them in creating willingness to have their thoughts and hold their 
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thoughts lightly, so that they are then freed up to engage in values-congruent rather 
than emotion-congruent actions. 
Experiential avoidance was also found to predict PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity, a finding that is consistent with those of many previous studies demonstrating 
a moderate and positive relationship between the two constructs (Gold, Feinstein, 
Skidmore, & Marx, 2011; Kumpula et al., 2011; Meyer & Morissette, 2013; 
Rosenthal, Rasmussen Hall, Palm, Batten, & Follette, 2008). It has been well 
demonstrated that avoidance of an internal stimulus, such as a thought or image, leads 
to a “rebound” effect, whereby the unwanted stimulus occurs with greater frequency 
and intensity (Nixon et al., 2009; Wenzlaff et al., 1991).  Studies of participants 
experiencing symptoms of PTSD have indicated that suppression of trauma-related 
thoughts or images also lead to a “rebound effect” of the thought or image (Amstadter 
& Vernon, 2006; Shipherd & Beck, 2000; Wisco et al., 2013).  
Experiential acceptance, or willingness, to have and make space for internal 
experiences of thoughts, emotions, sensations, and memories, has been associated with 
less overall PTSD symptom severity (Kashdan et al., 2009; Meyer & Morissette, 2013; 
Thompson & Waltz, 2010). Willingness to make contact with uncomfortable and 
painful internal experiences may lead to lowered PTSD intrusion symptom severity 
through the absence of active attempts to change internal experiences; that is, the 
absence of avoidance strategies would also eliminate the rebound effect. It is also 
possible that willingness, or acceptance, may allow for lowered PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity by making room for clients to engage in, or benefit from, exposure 
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to traumatic material, such as in Prolonged Exposure Therapy (PE; Foa, Hembree, & 
Rothbaum, 2007; Thompson, Luoma, & LeJeune, 2013).  
Evidence-based treatments for PTSD, such as Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT; 
Resick & Schnicke, 1992) and PE, have demonstrated efficacy in reducing PTSD 
symptoms through randomized controlled trials (Chard, 2005; Edna B Foa et al., 2005; 
Monson et al., 2006). However, dropout rates from CPT and PE within Veteran 
samples have ranged from approximately 38 to 50% (Kehle-Forbes, Meis, Spoont, & 
Polusny, 2016; Miles & Thompson, 2016) and many clients who do complete 
treatment do not respond with the expected reduction in PTSD symptoms (Hagenaars, 
van Minnen, & Hoogduin, 2010). It may be important to focus on building experiential 
acceptance prior to, or concurrently with, the use of evidence-based exposure 
techniques for PTSD, to enhance clients’ willingness to remain in treatment through 
exposures and to increase clients’ level of engagement during, and subsequent benefit 
from, exposures.  
Also as expected, experiential avoidance was found to mediate the relationship 
between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity. It appears that 
cognitive fusion is associated with increased PTSD symptom severity through its 
relationship with experiential avoidance. When individuals are fused with their 
thought content then they are more likely to engage in attempts to change and alter 
their thoughts – in emotionally driven behaviors. The significant results in relation to 
this mediation model highlight the important role of experiential avoidance in 
maintaining PTSD intrusion symptoms and the potential utility of cognitive defusion 
techniques to facilitate experiential acceptance, or willingness.  
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Explicit cognitive defusion exercises are not currently included in the evidence-
based treatments for PTSD. Such exercises may assist in facilitating willingness to 
engage with trauma-related material by providing clients with distance from their 
thoughts, including their thoughts about themselves in relation to the trauma. It is 
likely that negative beliefs about self (e.g., “I am a bad person”) are activated when 
individuals diagnosed with PTSD encounter trauma-related material. For individuals 
who are cognitively fused, associated emotion-driven behaviors may include hiding, or 
isolating, from others, including therapists, in attempts to reduce shame, or self-harm 
behaviors in attempts to reduce anger. As clients experiencing shame-related thoughts 
might be expected to withhold those thoughts from their therapists, it has been 
recommended that therapists treating PTSD specifically assess for the presence of 
shame. Once shame-related thoughts have been identified then cognitive defusion 
techniques could be introduced in a compassionate manner. For example, one 
cognitive defusion exercise consists of the client writing a thought about themselves 
that often “grabs” them on a nametag and then wearing it on their shirt (Hayes et al., 
1999). The therapist does not ask the client to attempt to alter their thinking in any 
way, but just to wear the nametag. Wearing the nametag could be useful in that it is 
bringing the client in contact with their trauma-related thought or it could be assisting 
the client in seeing that the thought is separate from their “self,” thereby increasing 
their willingness to engage with trauma-related material via a less-threatening vantage 
point.   
Cognitive Fusion, Lack of Contact with the Present Moment, and PTSD Intrusion 
Symptoms 
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 This study found that cognitive fusion was significantly associated with lack of 
contact with the present moment. The results indicate that cognitive fusion, or taking 
one’s thoughts as literal truths, can significantly predict the extent to which one’s 
attention is rooted in the present moment. It is possible that taking thoughts literally 
also equates to more time spent inside the process of thinking, or “lost” in thoughts. 
When someone is lost in, or fused with, their thoughts, it could be said that their 
attention is directed towards stimuli that are not actually occurring in the present 
moment. Much thought content consists of evaluations, review of past events, and 
predictions regarding the future, none of which can be objectively located in the 
present. The thought itself, a product of the process of thinking, however, is occurring 
in the present moment. People whose attention is directed toward the present moment 
may take note of their thoughts by acknowledging that the thoughts are present. The 
act of distancing oneself from thought content by acknowledging the present moment 
process of thinking may allow for a relationship with thoughts that includes contact 
with the present moment.  
 The finding that cognitive fusion is significantly associated with lack of contact 
with the present moment has important implications for treatment. There are many 
exercises to assist with thought defusion, and one of those exercises, called the 
“having a thought” technique, simply involves beginning each sentence with the 
words, “I’m having the thought that…” (Hayes et al., 1999). The exercise is intended 
to allow the client to relate to their thoughts from an observer perspective, rather than 
from within the thought, as if the thought mirrors reality. It is also possible, given 
these findings, that other cognitive defusion techniques, even those that do not 
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explicitly foster an observer perspective, may assist clients in making contact with the 
present moment. For example, the “word repetition” or “milk” exercise, consists of 
asking a client to quickly and loudly repeat a word to which they have attached 
meaning until the client briefly loses contact with the meaning of the word and focuses 
on the sounds coming out of their mouth and the sensations in their body as they 
repeat the word (Hayes et al., 1999).  
Also as hypothesized, lack of contact with the present moment was 
significantly associated with PTSD intrusion symptom severity. This finding is 
consistent with previous research indicating that there is a significant and negative 
relationship between lack of contact with the present moment and PTSD total 
symptom severity (Bernstein et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2011; Vujanovic et al., 2013). 
There is a large body of literature supporting the role of avoidance in the maintenance 
of PTSD intrusion symptoms (Kumpula et al., 2011; McFarlane, 1992; Michael et al., 
2005; Steil & Ehlers, 2000). It appears that lack of contact with the present moment 
may lead to increased PTSD intrusion symptom severity, as it is difficult to engage in 
“acceptance” of internal experiences, or thoughts, emotions, and sensations, occurring 
in the present moment when attention is directed away from the present. A person can 
lose contact with the present moment because a trauma memory has grabbed hold of 
their attention, because they are experiencing a flashback, because they are worrying 
about the potential for harm in the future, because they are distracting themselves with 
external stimuli, or because they are engaged in an emotional numbing or thought 
suppression technique. Recent studies have found that assisting clients in increasing 
their present moment awareness, through learning and practicing mindfulness 
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techniques, decreases PTSD intrusion symptom severity (Possemato et al., 2016; 
Wahbeh, Goodrich, Goy, & Oken, 2016).  
Lastly, it was hypothesized that lack of contact with the present moment would 
mediate the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity. Lack of contact with the present moment did not mediate the relationship 
between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity, after controlling for 
the impact of age and sexual identity on PTSD intrusion symptom severity. This is the 
first known study, to this author, to examine the hypothesis that lack of contact with 
the present moment mediates the relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD 
intrusion symptom severity.  
It is also important to look at the size of the associations between lack of 
contact with the present moment, cognitive fusion, and PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity. Although there was a significant association between cognitive fusion and 
lack of contact with the present moment, the size of the association was small.  A 
similar small, but significant, association was found between lack of contact with the 
present moment and PTSD intrusion symptom severity. Overall, one main theme 
throughout this set of findings was that lack of contact with the present moment was 
weakly associated with the other constructs within its hypothesized relationships.  
One potential explanation for these weak relationships is that this sample was 
too small to detect the full effect of lack of contact on the present moment on the 
dependent variables when covariates were included in the analyses. Although post hoc 
power analyses indicated that power was equivalent to 1.00 for all analyses, a priori 
power analyses indicate that, if the expected effect size were small, then the sample 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY AND PTSD                                                 48				 
size would need to range from 320 to 600 participants to detect the effect (Cohen, 
1992).The lack of consistency in the findings of studies examining the relationship 
between lack of contact with the present moment and PTSD symptom severity may 
also be attributed to low sample sizes (Bernstein et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2011; 
Vujanovic et al., 2013).  
It is also possible that the weak relationships between lack of contact with the 
present moment, cognitive fusion, and PTSD intrusion symptom severity are due to 
poor external validity of the MAAS, the measure used within this study to capture lack 
of contact with the present moment. The MAAS was validated on university students, 
adults in the community via a mail order survey, cancer patients, and community 
members of a Zen meditation center (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Although correlational 
data between the MAAS and measures of well-being and psychopathology were 
published in the validation study, the authors did not provide mean total scores for the 
measures used within the study. Thus, it is not possible to speak to the severity of the 
symptomatology of their sample in relationship to the sample within this study. A 
separate study examining the relationship between the MAAS and PTSD symptom 
severity found significant but small relationships between the MAAS and PTSD 
symptom severity; the average total PTSD symptom severity of their sample appears 
to be lower than the same for this sample (Bernstein, Tanay, & Vujanovic, 2011).  
A third possible explanation is that lack of contact with the present moment, as 
a phenomenon, is difficult to measure through self-report due its very nature. That is, 
when someone is not in contact with the present moment, they are also not observing 
their lack of contact with the present moment and cannot accurately report on it later. 
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Research has demonstrated that individuals who self-endorse greater attention towards 
and awareness of the present moment show greater concordance between their implicit 
and explicit emotional states (Brown & Ryan, 2003). However, additional research is 
needed to determine whether or not self-report of contact with present moment 
converges with behavioral, physiological, or observational data of such contact.  
Experiential Avoidance, Lack of Contact with the Present Moment, and PTSD 
Intrusion Symptom 
 As proposed within this study, experiential avoidance and lack of contact with 
the present moment were significantly associated. This result is consistent with the 
assumption contained within the psychological flexibility model, that these two 
constructs are both overlapping and partially unique. Although previous findings have 
demonstrated a moderate correlation between experiential avoidance and lack of 
contact with the present moment (Baer et al., 2006; Herzberg et al., 2012; Latzman & 
Masuda, 2013; Masuda & Tully, 2012; McCracken & Gutiérrez-Martínez, 2011), this 
study is the first known to this author to do so within a sample of participants 
experiencing symptoms of posttraumatic stress.  
Contrary to expectations, experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the 
present moment did not both significantly and uniquely contribute to PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity. Experiential avoidance had a significant and unique impact in the 
model, but lack of contact with the present moment did not. It is important to consider 
that experiential avoidance may play a larger role in the development and maintenance 
of PTSD intrusion symptom severity than that of lack of contact with the present 
moment. One study conducted within a sample of undergraduate students experiencing 
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sub-threshold PTSD symptoms found that experiential avoidance and thought 
suppression, a form of experiential avoidance, were both more strongly related with 
PTSD avoidance symptom severity than any facets of contact with the present 
moment, including the tendency to observe one’s experience, describing or putting 
words to one’s experience, and acting with awareness (Thompson & Waltz, 2010). 
Theorists have surmised that experiential acceptance, the opposite of experiential 
avoidance, may have greater predictive power over symptoms of psychopathology 
than awareness, or contact with the present moment.  
It is possible that experiential avoidance, that is, active attempts to avoid 
unwanted internal stimuli, predicts PTSD symptom severity above and beyond that 
predicted by lack of contact with the present moment because it is the active attempts 
to avoid the present moment that maintain the PTSD symptoms themselves. Perhaps a 
person can lose contact with the present moment, including internal stimuli, and not 
experience intrusive recurrences of the internal stimuli with which they lost contact. In 
this case, lack of contact with the present moment could be conceptualized as a passive 
process, while experiential avoidance would be characterized by active attempts to 
avoid. Active internal experiential avoidance strategies could take the form of thought 
suppression, emotional numbing, or dissociation.  
There is a large body of literature suggesting that acceptance, or willingness to 
have ones’ private internal experiences is associated with improved mental health 
outcomes (Baer et al., 2008; Latzman & Masuda, 2013; McCracken et al., 2011; 
Osman, Lamis, Bagge, Freedenthal, & Barnes, 2015; Sahdra, Shaver, & Brown, 2010; 
Smith et al., 2011).  Experiential acceptance could be considered the corollary to 
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experiential avoidance (Hayes, Strosahl, Bunting, et al., 2004; Hayes et al., 2012).  If 
experiential avoidance plays a more important role in the development and 
maintenance of PTSD intrusion symptoms than lack of contact with the present 
moment, then exercises including experiential acceptance components, in addition to 
components consisting of awareness, observation, or noticing of internal experiences, 
should provide a greater reduction in PTSD intrusion symptom severity than exercises 
consisting solely of observation components.  
It is also possible that both experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the 
present moment significantly and uniquely relate to PTSD intrusion symptom severity, 
but that the size of the effect for lack of contact with the present moment is smaller 
than that of experiential avoidance – that is, too small to be detected within the current 
sample size with two covariates.  
Also contrary to expectations, experiential avoidance did not mediate the 
relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity after 
controlling for lack of contact with the present moment. Given that experiential 
avoidance and lack of contact with the present moment were moderately related and 
lack of contact with the present moment did not significantly or uniquely contribute to 
PTSD intrusion symptom severity beyond the variance contributed by experiential 
avoidance, it is possible that there was some redundancy between the two mediators. 
Lack of contact with the present moment and experiential avoidance both incorporate 
inattention to the present moment. If lack of contact with the present moment is 
conceptualized as having an additional passive component and experiential avoidance 
is conceptualized as having an additional active component, then experiential 
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avoidance may be a stronger mediator, in part, because of its active component. 
Regardless, it appears that including experiential avoidance, and just experiential 
avoidance, as a mediator in this model is most parsimonious.  
Lastly, lack of contact with the present moment did not mediate the 
relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity when 
accounting for experiential avoidance. These results are not surprising in light of prior 
results indicating that lack of contact with the present moment did not mediate the 
relationship between cognitive fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity and that 
lack of contact with the present moment did not significantly and uniquely contribute 
to PTSD intrusion symptom severity alongside experiential avoidance.  
Age, Sexual Identity, and PTSD Intrusion Symptom Severity 
Age and sexual identity were both associated with PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity, such that older and sexual minority participants reported greater intrusion 
symptom severity than younger and heterosexual participants. Sexual identity also 
impacted experiential avoidance, with participants identifying as sexual minorities 
endorsing greater experiential avoidance than participants identifying as heterosexual.  
The results of this study also highlight the importance of collecting information 
regarding participants’ sexual identities. Previous literature has documented that 
sexual minority individuals experience higher exposure to trauma and are at higher 
risk for the development of PTSD than heterosexual individuals (Balsam, Huang, 
Fieland, Simoni, & Walters, 2004; Balsam, Rothblum, & Beauchaine, 2005; 
D’Augelli, Grossman, & Starks, 2006; Lehavot & Simpson, 2014; Roberts, Rosario, 
Corliss, Koenen, & Austin, 2012). Consistent with previous literature (Gold et al., 
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2011; Weiss, Garvert, & Cloitre, 2015), sexual minority participants in this study 
demonstrated higher levels of experiential avoidance and PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity than heterosexual participants. It will be important for future researchers to 
collect information on sexual identity when examining trauma symptomatology.  
Age was used as a covariate in this study as older participants endorsed greater 
levels of PTSD intrusion symptom severity than younger participants. Existing 
research regarding the impact of age on PTSD symptom severity demonstrates mixed 
findings. A study of Veterans of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) indicates that lower age is associated with higher PTSD symptom 
severity in men and that age is not significantly related to PTSD symptom severity in 
women (Janke-Stedronsky et al., 2015). Studies have also found no relationship 
between age and PTSD symptom severity (Ali, Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers, 2002; Gil, 
2005; Smith et al., 2011; Tull et al., 2004; Ullman & Filipas, 2001).  
The mean age of participants in this study was significantly different between 
the two recruitment sources. The student subject pool sample was significantly 
younger than the online community sample (please see Supplemental Analyses 
section). Although age was significantly related to PTSD intrusion symptom severity 
in the total sample, that was not the case when each recruitment source was treated as 
its own sample. The lack of a significant relationship between age and PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity in either the student subject pool sample or the online community 
sample, when examined individually, could be due to low variance within the age of 
participants in the sample or it could be due to the higher PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity in the online community sample.  
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 It is possible that these findings are generalizable to populations formally 
diagnosed with PTSD. The average PTSD total symptom severity within this sample 
was above the clinical cut-off score of 50, indicating that the total symptom severity 
was consistent with that typically found in populations diagnosed with PTSD 
(Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996). Future research examining 
the relationships between cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, lack of contact with 
the present moment, and PTSD intrusion symptom severity, within participants 
formally diagnosed with PTSD, is needed to provide further support for the 
generalizability of the findings within this study.  
Limitations 
This study contains several limitations. The use of retrospective self-report 
measures introduces a larger likelihood of measurement error than the use of clinician-
administered interviews. It is possible that avoidance leads individuals to underreport 
their symptoms of posttraumatic stress. It is also possible that the ability to report 
accurately on the behavioral processes of cognitive fusion, experiential avoidance, and 
lack of contact with the present moment interacts with the processes themselves, such 
that individuals with higher levels of the processes experience greater difficulty with 
accurate reports. In the future, it will be important to supplement self-report 
inventories with behavioral measures.   
The measures in this study were administered in the same order to all 
participants. Therefore, order effects cannot be ruled out as contributing to the results. 
Fatigue effects, in particular, may have caused participants to respond more 
haphazardly to items at the end of the study, as compared to those at the beginning of 
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the study. It will be important to randomize the order in which these measures are 
presented in subsequent research.  
The cross-sectional design of the study limits the inferences that can be made 
from the data. For example, it is impossible to deduce whether cognitive fusion causes 
experiential avoidance, lack of contact with the present moment, or PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity. Likewise, it is not possible to determine whether lack of contact 
with the present moment or experiential avoidance cause higher PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity. Longitudinal assessment and treatment outcome studies are needed 
to test the hypothesized causal relationships between the behavioral processes and 
PTSD intrusion symptom severity and between the behavioral processes themselves; 
those results may influence the delivery of therapy.  
Age and sexual identity were both related with PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity, such that older and sexual minority participants reported greater intrusion 
symptom severity than younger and heterosexual participants. Sexual identity also 
impacted experiential avoidance, with participants identifying as sexual minorities 
endorsing greater experiential avoidance than participants identifying as heterosexual. 
However, due to limitations within the PROCESS macro used to test the proposed 
mediation models, the impact of sexual identity on experiential avoidance was not 
controlled for within the 4 analyses that utilized the macro.   
This sample was composed of participants recruited through two separate 
mechanisms. Those recruited through the UMSL student subject pool reported less 
severe symptoms of PTSD than participants recruited from the online community. 
Although combining the two samples afforded greater variance within all of the 
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dependent variables, including PTSD intrusion symptom severity, it is also possible 
that the differences between the samples impacted the results within this study. For 
example, age was significantly associated with PTSD intrusion symptom severity 
within the total sample, but not within each recruitment source sample. It is possible 
that the relationship between the two variables within the total sample is largely 
accounted for by the significant difference in PTSD intrusion symptom severity within 
the two recruitment source samples.  
It should also be noted that the current sample contained both individuals 
experiencing clinically significant levels of posttraumatic stress (PCL-S Total score > 
50) and individuals with sub-threshold symptoms (PCL-S total score < 50; Blanchard, 
Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996). On the one hand, the average PTSD 
total symptom severity within this study was above the clinical cut-off score of 50. On 
the other hand, 108 of the 308 participants had PCL-S total scores under 50. Thus, 
participants in this study could be conceptualized as either comparable to or higher 
functioning than a clinical sample. It will be important to replicate and expand upon 
this research within clinical samples, to test the generalizability of these findings.  
Lastly, participants provided information about their exposure to traumatic 
events on both the LEC and the PCL-S. Participants were determined to have 
experienced a Criterion A traumatic event if they indicated that they were completing 
the PCL-S in reference to a Criterion A event, such as “rape,” “domestic violence,” or 
“witnessed a murder,” and had endorsed experiencing the corresponding trauma type 
on the LEC. In some cases, such as when a participant identified the heart attack of a 
loved one as their traumatic event on the PCL-S, it was clear that the event did not 
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meet Criterion A. However, in other cases, such as when a participant wrote “abuse” 
on the PCL-S and had endorsed experiencing sexual abuse and domestic violence on 
the LEC, it was possible that the participant was referring to an instance of sexual or 
physical abuse on the PCL-S. Thus, when a participant identified abuse as their 
Criterion A event on the PCL-S and also endorsed a Criterion A-related instance of 
abuse on the LEC the participant was included in the sample. Future studies 
incorporating a clinician-administered interview for PTSD, such as the CAPS, would 
better ensure that participants meeting eligibility requirements were included and those 
who did not were excluded.  
Future Research 
The psychological flexibility model places equal importance on the role of lack of 
contact with the present moment and experiential avoidance in the development and 
maintenance of PTSD intrusion symptom severity. However, it appears that 
experiential avoidance has a stronger relationship to PTSD intrusion symptoms than 
lack of contact with the present moment. There are numerous important questions to 
ask a result of this research: 1). Does experiential avoidance mediate the relationship 
between lack of contact with the present moment and PTSD intrusion symptom 
severity? 2). In what direction are the relationships between cognitive fusion, 
experiential avoidance, lack of contact with the present moment, and PTSD intrusion 
symptom severity? 3). Is it possible to differentiate between lack of contact with the 
present moment that includes active attempts to avoid internal experiences and lack of 
contact with the present moment without active attempts to avoid? 4). Do exercises 
consisting of both awareness and acceptance of present moment trauma-related 
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internal experiences have a greater impact than exercises solely focused on awareness 
(e.g., observing and describing internal experiences) in terms of reducing PTSD 
intrusion symptom severity? Additionally, future researchers should be certain to 
collect information regarding their participants’ sexual identities, as exposure to 
traumatic experiences and PTSD symptom severity can differ depending on sexual 
identity.  
Conclusions  
The present study provides support for many of the proposed relationships 
within the psychological flexibility model, within a sample of trauma-exposed 
participants experiencing symptoms of posttraumatic stress. Cognitive fusion, 
experiential avoidance, and lack of contact with the present moment were all 
significantly associated with PTSD intrusion symptom severity. Cognitive fusion was 
also significantly associated with experiential avoidance and lack of contact with the 
present moment. Experiential avoidance mediated the relationship between cognitive 
fusion and PTSD intrusion symptom severity, while lack of contact with the present 
moment did not. Future research should focus on the strength and direction of the 
relationships between lack of contact with the present moment, experiential avoidance, 
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f) You don’t have an option that applies to me. I identify as (Please 
specify): ____________________________ 
 








h) You don’t have an option that applies to me. I identify as (Please 
specify): ____________________________ 
 
4. What is your racial origin? 
a) African American or Black 
b) White 
c) Native Hawaiian or Pacific islander 
d) Asian 
e) American Indian or Alaska Native 
f) Multiracial 




5. What is your Ethnic origin? 
a) Hispanic or Latina     ___________ 
b) Not Hispanic or Latina  ___________ 
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6. How many years of education have you completed? 
     For example:     ______________ 
 
Completion of: # Of Years 
Grade school 8 
High school 12 
College 16 






Choose the level of education that is most applicable to you:   ___________ 
a) Graduate or professional training (degree obtained) 
b) Partial graduate or professional training 
c) College graduate (degree obtained) 
d) Partial college training (include technical schooling beyond high 
school) 
e) High school graduate (graduate of technical or trade school) 
f) Partial high school (10th grade through partial 12th grade) 
g) Elementary school (6th grade or less) 
 
8. What is your current occupation? (State if more than one) 
 
     ___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
9. How many hours per week (during a normal week) are you employed?    







Are you currently serving in the armed forces/are you a veteran?            
 
What is your current marital status? 
a) Single 
b) Married 
c) Domestic partnership 
d) Separated 
e) Divorced 






12. What is your current annual household income level? 
a) Less than $5000 
b) $5,001 – 10,000 
c) $10,001 – 20,000 
d) $20,001 – 30,000 
e) $30,001 – 50,000 
f) More than $50,000 
 
________ 
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13. Who do you currently live with? (Please list relationship to yourself, gender, 
and age but do not include the individuals’ names) 
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Appendix B 
Life Events Checklist (LEC) 
Listed below are a number of difficult or stressful things that sometimes happen to 
people. For each event check one or more of the boxes to the right to indicate that: (a) 
it happened to you personally, (b) you witnessed it happen to someone else, (c) you 
learned about it happening to someone close to you, (d) you’re not sure if it fits, or (e) 
it doesn’t apply to you.  
 
Be sure to consider your entire life (growing up as well as adulthood) as you go 








Not sure Doesn’t 
apply 
1. Natural disaster 
(for example, flood, 
hurricane, tornado, 
earthquake 
     






wreck, plane crash) 
     
4. Serious accident 
at work, home, or 
during recreational 
activity 
     





     
6. Physical assault 




     




threatened with a 
knife, gun, bomb) 
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8. Sexual assault 
(rape, attempted 
rape, made to 
perform any type of 
sexual act through 
force or threat of 
harm) 
     
9. Other unwanted 
or uncomfortable 
sexual experience 
     
10. Combat or 
exposure to a war-
zone (in the 
military or as a 
civilian) 
     




hostage, prisoner of 
war) 
     
12. Life-threatening 
illness or injury 
     
13. Severe human 
suffering 
     
14. Sudden violent 
death (for example, 
homicide, suicide) 
     
15. Sudden, 
unexpected death of 
someone close to 
you 
     
16. Serious injury, 
harm, or death you 
caused to someone 
else 
     
17. Any other very 
stressful event or 
experience 
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Appendix C 
PTSD Checklist – Specific Version (PCL-S) 
 
The event you experienced was: (please specify event) _____________________.  
This event occurred on: (please specify date) ___________.  
Instructions: Below is a list of problems and complaints that people sometimes have in 
response to stressful life experiences. Please read each one carefully, then circle one of 
the numbers to the right to indicate how much you have been bothered by that problem 
in the past month.  
 1  2  3  4  5 
Not at all      A little        Moderately       Quite a bit      Extremely  
      
1. Repeated, disturbing memories, thoughts, or images of the  
stressful experience?        1  2  3  4  5   
      2.   Repeated, disturbing dreams of the stressful experience?   1  2  3  4  5   
      3.   Suddenly acting or feeling as if the stressful experience were 
            happening again  (as if you were reliving it)?    1  2  3  4  5  
       4.  Feeling very upset when something reminded you  of the  
            stressful experience?         1  2  3  4  5   
5. Having physical reactions (e.g., heart pounding, trouble  
breathing, sweating) when something reminded you of the  
stressful experience?         1  2  3  4  5   
6. Avoiding thinking about or talking about the stressful  
experience or avoiding having feelings related to it?   1  2  3  4  5 
7. Avoiding activities or situations because they reminded you 
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of the stressful experience?         1  2  3  4  5 
8. Trouble remembering important parts of the stressful  
experience?           1  2  3  4  5 
      9.   Loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy?     1  2  3  4  5     
    10.   Feeling distant or cut off from other people?    1  2  3  4  5   
    11.   Feeling emotionally numb or being unable to have loving 
feelings for those close to you?        1  2  3  4  5   
    12.   Feeling as if your future will somehow be cut short?   1  2  3  4  5   
    13.   Trouble falling or staying asleep?      1  2  3  4  5   
    14.   Feeling irritable or having angry outbursts?     1  2  3  4  5   
    15.   Having difficulty concentrating?      1  2  3  4  5   
    16.   Being “super-alert” or watchful or on guard?    1  2  3  4  5   











PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY AND PTSD                                                 76				 
Appendix D 
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you 
by circling a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.  
   1           2            3       4               5               6           7 
never      very seldom       seldom      sometimes   frequently    almost always    always 
true              true                  true             true              true                 true                true 
 
1. My thoughts cause me distress or emotional pain.                  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
2. I get so caught up in my thoughts that I am unable to do the  
things that I most want to do.                                                      1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
3. I over-analyse situations to the point where it’s unhelpful 
 to me.               1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
4. I struggle with my thoughts.                                                      1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
5. I get upset with myself for having certain thoughts.        1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
6. I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts.                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
7. It’s such a struggle to let go of upsetting thoughts even when I  
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Appendix E 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire - II 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you 
by circling a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice. 
   1           2            3       4               5               6           7 
never      very seldom       seldom      sometimes   frequently    almost always    always 
true              true                  true             true              true                 true                true 
 
 
1. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me       
 to live a life that I would value.            1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
2. I’m afraid of my feelings.                                                            1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
3. I worry about not being able to control my worries and  
feelings.               1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
4. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling  
life.                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
5. Emotions cause problems in my life.                                          1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
6. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I 
 am.              1  2  3  4  5  6  7 






PSYCHOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY AND PTSD                                                 78				 
Appendix F 
Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale  
Below is a collection of statements about your everyday experience. Using the 1–6 
scale below, please indicate how frequently or infrequently you currently have each 
experience. Please answer according to what really reflects your experience rather than 
what you think your experience should be.   
 
   1            2              3            4          5                      6            
almost          very              somewhat      somewhat           very                almost  




1. I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until 
some time later.       1  2  3  4  5  6   
2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or 
thinking of something else.      1  2  3  4  5  6   
3. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present. 1  2  3  4  5  6   
4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I’m going without paying attention   
to what I experience along the way.     1  2  3  4  5  6   
5. I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they 
really grab my attention.      1  2  3  4  5  6   
6. I forget a person’s name almost as soon as I’ve been told it for the first 
time.         1  2  3  4  5  6   
7. It seems I am “running on automatic” without much awareness of what 
I’m doing.        1  2  3  4  5  6   
8. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them.  1  2  3  4  5  6   
9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with 
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what I am doing right now to get there.    1  2  3  4  5  6   
10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I’m 
doing.          1  2  3  4  5  6   
11. I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something 
else at the same time.       1  2  3  4  5  6   
12. I drive places on “automatic pilot” and then wonder why I went 
there.                      1  2  3  4  5  6   
13. I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past.   1  2  3  4  5  6   
14. I find myself doing things without paying attention.    1  2  3  4  5  6   
15. I snack without being aware that I’m eating.    1  2  3  4  5  6   
 
 
 
 	
